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Our Land Co South Unit 
DIVISION OF OIL & GAS RESOURCES 
MANAGEMENT, ORDER OF THE 
COMMISSION GRANTING 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Appearances: 
Appellee. 
Phillip J. Campanella, Counsel for Appellants Keith J. Kerns, et a/.; Daniel Martin, Brian Becker, 
Tasha N. Miracle, Assistant Attorneys General, Counsel for Appellee Division of Oil & Gas 
Resources Management. 
On November 17,2015, Appellants Keith J. Kerns, et al., filed with the Oil & Gas 
Commission, a Notice of Appeal from Chief's Order 2015-348. Chief's Order 2015-348 approved 
an application for unitization, associated with an oil & gas drilling unit known as the Our Land Co 
South Unit.1 The Appellants own certain property overlying a portion of the oil & gas resources 
committed to this unit. 
BACKGROUND 
This matter now comes before the Commission pursuant to a Motion to Dismiss 
filed by the Appellee Division on February 24, 2016. Appellants responded thereto on April 1, 
2016, and the Division replied on April 13, 2016. On June 9, 2016, the Commission heard oral 
arguments on this motion. 
1 This unitization was sought by Chesapeake Exploration, LLC [''Chesapeake"]. Chesapeake did not petition to intervene into this 
matter. Chesapeake is not a party to this appeal, and has not participated in any manner in this appeal. 
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An evidentiary hearing has not been conducted in this appeal. However, certain 
factual matters are contained within the pleadings and other filings of the parties. The following 
facts will aid in a full understanding of the issues presented, and do not appear to be in dispute: 
I. Keith J. & Corey A. Kerns, Mark & Linda Zantene, Helen Zantene, Connie 
Huhn and the Robert J. Zantene Trust [the "Appellants"] own property in Harrison County, Ohio. 
2. In 1981, the Appellants, or their predecessors in interest, leased certain oil & 
gas rights to a company known as New Frontier Exploration, Inc. ["New Frontier"]. Appellants 
contend that the 1981 leases contained specific restrictions regarding: (I) assignment, (2) joinder 
with other leases, (3) the number of wells to be drilled, and (4) the size of drilling units. In or 
shortly after 1981, three wells were drilled, which wells produced from the Clinton Formation on 
the leased acres. 
3. In or around December 22, 1983, New Frontier was "merged out of 
existence." New Frontier is no longer in operation. 
4. The 1981 leases with New Frontier had been assigned, or otherwise 
transferred, to American Energy-Utica ["ABU"]. 
5. On November 10, 2014, Chesapeake Exploration, LLC ["Chesapeake"] filed 
with the Division of Oil & Gas Resources Management [the "Division"] an application seeking unit 
operations in the Utica/Point Pleasant Formations underlying lands in Harrison County, Ohio. The 
proposed unit would be known as the Our Land Co South Unit, and would be comprised of 50 
separate tracts, encompassing a total of 592.8175310 acres. The Unit Plan proposed the drilling of 
three horizontal oil & gas wells from a single well pad. 
6. Chesapeake's application acknowledged that Chesapeake had been unable to 
secure voluntary leases for two tracts within the proposed unit (these two tracts totaled approximately 2 
acres). Chesapeake's application also specifically addressed eight tracts ofland, totaling 120.549972 
acres, which had originally been leased to New Frontier, stating: 
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Furthennore, an additional 120.549972 acres owned by ABU 
(approximately 20.33509% of the uoit Area) is depicted as Non-
Confonning Acreage which, while leased, due to the tenns 
within the lease cannot be pooled without either the consent of 
the mineral owners, lease modifications, or a unitization 
proceeding. 121 
7. On January 23, 2015, the Division notified the Appellants of Chesapeake's 
unitization application. During the application process, the Appellants made filings with the 
Division opposing the application. On March II, 2015, the Appellants, or representatives of the 
Appellants, attended a Division hearing addressing Chesapeake's application. 
8. On February 23, 2015, Appellants filed a Complaint in the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, alleging claims in connection with a potential 
"takings" of their natural gas rights. Chesapeake and the Division were parties to the federal suit. 
The Appellants asked the federal court to make certain determinations regarding the property rights 
of Chesapeake vis-a-vis the Appellants' property rights. At the time of Appellants' filing in the 
federal court, the Division Chief had not yet acted upon Chesapeake's pending application for 
unitization. On September I, 2015, the federal court dismissed Appellants' case for failure to state 
a federal claim ripe for review. Kerns. et ql. v. Chesapeake Exploration. LLC. et al, 15-CV-346 (2015). 
9. On July 13, 2015, the Division issued Chiefs Order 2015-348 [the 
"Unitization Order"], approving Chesapeake's application for unitization and formally establishing 
the Our Land Co South Unit. The Unitization Order addressed the Appellants' properties as 
follows: 
4) Chesapeake's application for unitization of the Our Land Co 
South Unit also proposed to include eight tracts for a total of 
120.549972 acres that were previously leased to American 
Energy-Utica ("ABU"). According to the application and 
subsequent testimony, Chesapeake was unable to come to a 
voluntary agreement with ABU to include the 120.549972 acres 
in the proposed Our Land Co South unit. ABU is therefore 
considered a "non-participating working interest owner" in the 
Our Land Co South unit as to the 120.549972 acres. 
2 The Appellants own an additional 65.217 acres, for which the Appellants have separately negotiated voluntary leases. These 
65.217 acres are included within the Our Land Co South Unit, but are not directly subject to the tenns and conditions of the 
Unitization Order. 
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10. While the Division issued the Unitization Order on July 13,2015, Appellants 
did not receive notice of the. issuance of the Unitization Order until November 4, 2015 when the 
Division provided a copy of the Unitization Order to Appellants' counsel. 
11. On November 17, 2015, the Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal from 
Unitization Order 2015-348 with the Oil & Gas Commission. Appellants contend that the 
Unitization Order is unlawful or unreasonable, and ask this Conunission to reverse and vacate the 
order. Appellants' grounds for appeal include the following allegations: 
The Chief erred in failing to grant Appellants' Motion to Dismiss 
[filed by Appellants with the Division during the Division 
Chiefs review of Chesapeake's unitization application] for the 
reason that the Applicant Chesapeake failed to engage in 
meaningful negotiations with the Appellants to lease the [non-
conforming acres] prior to filing its [Unitization] Application. 
The Chief erred in failing to rule that the [Unitization] 
Application is premature and an abuse of process because the 
Application seeks to substitute forced unitization for good faith 
and meaningful negotiations between the Appellants and the 
Applicant Chesapeake, particularly since the Appellants have 
offered to lease the [non-conforming acres] upon the same terms 
[as other leases for which the Appellants have signed voluntary 
leases in this unit]. 
The [Unitization] Order directs the involuntary taking of 
Appellants' land and mineral rights without a declaration that the 
taking is for a public use, * * * all in violation of* * * the Ohio 
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
The [Unitization] Order unconstitutionally deprives the 
Appellants of their incidents of ownership including the 
exclusive right to possession, control, custody, use, benefit and 
disposition of their land and mineral rights by unlawfully 
authorizing Chesapeake to enter into . the subsurface of 
Appellants' land by means of horizontal drilling * • * to remove 
oil, gas and natural gas liquids from beneath Appellants' land, 
and to take possession of said minerals and to dispose of them. 
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RULING UPON THE MOTION TO DISMISS 
O.R.C. §1509.28 allows the Division to join separate mineral interests, for the 
purpose of creating a drilling unit that will produce from an identified pool or from a portion of an 
identified pool. In attempting to establish such unit operations, there may be properties for which 
the operator could not successfully negotiate voluntary leases. Where such unleased properties 
exist, the operator may apply to the Chief for "forced" unitization under O.R.C. § 1509.28. 
To apply for such unitization, the applicant must own the mineral rights to at least 
65% of the land overlying the proposed pool. Also, in reviewing the application, the Division Chief 
must affirmatively find that: 
• * • (s]uch operation is reasonably necessary to increase 
substantially the ultimate recovery of oil and gas, and the 
value of estimated additional recovery of oil or gas exceed 
the estimated additional cost incident to conducing the 
operation. 
(See O.R.C. §1 509.28(A).) If these conditions are met, the Chief may statutorily establish unit 
operations, and may allow the inclusion of unleased properties within a statutory unit. See Gary L. 
Teeter Revocable Trust v. Division andRE. Gas Development, (Oil & Gas Commission, #895; Sept. 17, 2015). 
A Chiefs order authorizing unit operations must be based upon terms and 
conditions that are 'just and reasonable." (S.ee O.RC. §I509.28(A).) The terms and conditions of a 
Unitization Order may include provisions for items such as royalty payments, or working interest 
payments, to unleased mineral owners. 
In this case, Unitization Order 20 I 5-348 brought two unleased properties into the 
Our Land Co South Unit, setting forth terms and conditions applicable to the owners of the 
unleased minerals for these two tracts.3 
3 Ultimately, one of the unleased mineral owners voluntarily entered into a lease. 
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Unitization Order 2015-348 also specifically addressed the mineral interests that the 
Appellants, or their predecessors, had leased to New Frontier in 1981. Chesapeake now identified 
these minerals as being owned by AEU. The mineral interests associated with these 120.549972 
acres were included in the Our Land Co South Unit under the authority of Unitization Order 2015-
348. The Unitization Order set forth specific provisions addressing, and limiting, the financial 
obligations of AEU with regards to these 120 acres (i.e., acknowledging tha~ as the owner of these non-
conforming acres, AEU would be a "non-participating working interest owner" in the Our Land Co South Unit that may 
be financially "carried"). 
Through the immediate appeal, the Appellants ask the Commission to reverse and 
vacate Unitization Order 2015-348. Primarily, the Appellants argue that the Chiefs approval of 
Chesapeake's application for unitization establishes unit operations without proper consideration of 
the Appellants' individual property rights. Appellants further contend that the Chiefs order results 
in an improper and unconstitutional "taking" of the Appellants' property. 
The Oil & Gas Commission is a creature of statute, created under Chapter 1509 of 
the Ohio Revised Code. See Bass Energy v. Division and Duck Creek Energy, (Oil & Gas Commission, #815; Jao. 
29, 2010); City of Munroe Falls v. Division and D & L Energy, (Oil & Gas Commission, #793; Aug. 7, 2008). As a 
creature of statute, the Commission possesses only those powers which have been expressly 
conferred by the General Assembly or which are necessarily implied. See Chesapeake Exploration v. Oil 
& Gas Commission (2011) 135 Ohio St.3d 204, quoting Delaney v. Testa, 128 Ohio St. 3d 248, 2011-0hio-550. 
Thus, the authority and jurisdiction of this Commission is both defmed and limited by the express 
provisions of Revised Code Chapter 1509. 
Questions regarding the validity of leases, as well as questions regarding other 
property rights disputes, are beyond the regulatory authority of the Division Chief. See Bruce Doolittle 
vs. Transcontinental Oil & Gas, Inc., (Franklin C.P., #94CVF02-839; Nov. 30, 1994). Because these issues are 
beyond the Chiefs regulatory authority, such issues are likewise beyond the jurisdiction of this 
Commission when reviewing the actions of the Chie£ Id 
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Tills Commission is not authorized to adjudicate property rights. See Clarence russel, 
Jr., eta/., v. Division and Kastle Resources Enterprises, (Oil & Gas Commission, #818; July 16,2010, ruling upon a motion in 
limine); Bass Energy v. Division and Duck Creek Energy, supra. 
In this appeal, the 120.549972 non-conforming acres at issue are, in fact, subject to 
leases. As the leases associated with these acres are not held by Chesapeake, and have not been 
voluntarily committed to the Our Land Co South Unit, the Chief included tenns in the Unitization 
Order, identifying these minerals as being owned by a "non-participating working interest owner." 
Since leases for the 120.549972 acres do exist, these acres cannot be classified as 
unleased mineral interests. Despite the Appellants' arguments to the contrary, Unitization Order 
2015-348 does not require that the 12.5% royalty applied to unleased mineral interest owners would 
also be applied to the 120.549972 acres held by a non-participating working interest owner. 
Unleased mineral owners are fundamentally different from leased, but non-participating, owners, 
and are treated distinctly under the terms and conditions of the Unitization Order. 
parties: 
A lease is the essential instrument that sets forth the rights and remedies of involved 
The rights and remedies of the parties to ao oil and gas lease 
must be detennined by the terms of the written instrument Such 
leases are contracts and the terms of the contract with the law 
applicable to such terms must govern the rights and remedies of 
the parties. 
See Harris v. Ohio Oil Co. (1897) 57 Ohio St. 118; Snyder v. Ohio Department of Natural Resources, 2014 Ohio 392. 
The Appellants may have concerns relating to the 1981leases. But, these questions 
cannot be addressed by the Division or decided by this Commission. Only a court of competent 
jurisdiction cao adjudicate property rights, can evaluate the validity of leases, or can determine the 
subsurface legal relationship between parties, such as Chesapeake, AEU and the Appellants. 
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It is also well-settled law in Ohio that administrative agencies and tribunals may not 
decide constitutional questions. See Mobile Oil Corp. v. City of Rocky River (1974) 38 Ohio St.2d 23; State, ex 
rel Park Investment Co. vs. Board ofT ax Appeals (1972) 32 Ohio St.2d 28. 
Thus, any contention by the Appellants that O.R.C. § 1509.28, or the Chief's 
application of O.R.C. § 1509.28 to the immediate facts, infringes upon the Appellants' 
constitutionally-protected rights must also be taken up before a court of competent jurisdiction, and 
simply cannot be determined by this Commission. See Bass Energy, Inc. v. Division & Duck Creek Energy, 
Inc., supra; Clewell Family Farm, LLC v. Division, #862 (July I, 2014, ruling on order on partial summary judgment). 
Frankly, both the Appellants and the Division appear to acknowledge the 
jurisdictional limitations of this Commission with regards to property rights and constitutional 
questions. However, the Appellants continue to assert that they are adversely affected by the terms 
and conditions of Unitization Order 2015-348, and contend that the Commission has some 
jurisdiction or authority to fashion a remedy for them. 
Notably, because the 120.549972 acres of concern are viewed by the Division as 
under lease, the only provision of the Unitization Order that specifically applies to these acres is 
the provision found at item 6 on page 4 of 8 of the Unitization Order, wherein the Division allows 
the "non-participating working interest owner" to be "carried," or otherwise financed, if unable to 
meet its financial obligations in connection with the unit operations. 
If the Appellants contend that ABU is not a proper lessee, or that the Division has 
incorrectly relied upon Chesapeake's assertions that the 120.549972 acre are non-conforming acres 
!!!!!!IT lease and available for inclusion in the Our Land Co South Unit as minerals owned by a 
"non-participating working interest owner," then the correct forum in which to litigate such disputes 
would be a court with the appropriate powers and authorities to review and resolve the property 
rights associated with these 120.549972 acres. 
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Significantly, O.R.C. §1509.36 anticipates that some issues attendant to the 
regulation of oil & gas operations may be more appropriately reviewed by the courts in the first 
instance. Thus, the jurisdiction of the Commission under O.RC. §1509.36 is not exclusive, and 
O.R.C. §1509.36 expressly provides: 
Sections 1509.01 to 1509.37 of the Revised Code, providing for 
appeals relating to orders by the chief or by the commission, or 
relating to rules adopted by the chief, do not constitute the 
exclusive procedure that any person who believes the person's 
rights to be unlawfully affected by those section or any official 
action taken thereunder must pursue in order to protect and 
preserve those rights, nor do those section constitute a procedure 
that that person must pursue before that person may lawfully 
appeal to the courts to protect and preserve those rights. 
See State ex rei. Fisher v. Nacelle Land & Mgt. Corp. 90 Ohio App.3d 93 (II" Dist., !993). 
ORDER 
FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN, and based upon the forgoing, the Commission 
FINDS the Division's Motion to Dismiss well-taken and hereby DISMISES appeal #910.4 
Date Issued: U L+4q '1, ;2..<!'1 (_p 
~c. ~L.YI(a4M 
DONALD L. MASON ~ 
4 In light of this ruling, the merit hearing scheduled for September I 5, 2016 is hereby cancelled and no rulings upon the 
discovery motions that have been pending in this appeal will be rendered. 
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR APPEAL 
This decision may be appealed to the Court of Common Pleas for Franklin County, 
within thirty days of your receipt of this decision, in accordance with Ohio Revised Code 
§1509.37. 
DISTRIBUTION: 
Phillip J. Campanella, Via Certified Mail#: 91 7199 9991 7030 3099 0753& E-Mail [p.campanella@att.net] 
Keith J. Kerns & Corey A. Kerns, Via Certified Mail#: 91 7199 9991 7030 3099 0760 
Mark Zantene, Via Certified Mail #: 91 7199 9991 7030 3099 0777 
Linda Zantene, Via Certified Mail#: 91 7199 9991 7030 3099 0784 
Helen Zantene, Via Certified Mail#: 91 7199 9991 7030 3099 0791 
Connie Huhn, Via Certified Mail#: 91 7199 9991 7030 3099 0807 
Robert J. Zantene Trust, Via Certified Mail#: 91 7199 9991 7030 3099 0814 
Daniel Martin, Brian Becker, Tasha N. Miracle, Via Inter-Office Certified Mail#: 6808 & E-Mail 
[daniel.rnartin@ohioattorneygeneral.gov; brian.becker@ohioattorneygeneral.gov; tasha.miracle@ohioattorneygeneral.gov] 
Richard J. Sinnners, Via Certified Mail#: 91 7199 9991 7030 3099 0821 
\ Katerina E. Milenkovski, Via Regular Mail & E-Mail [Kathy.Milenkovski@Steptoe-Johnson.com] 
-10-
